Transportation security system and associated methods

ABSTRACT

A security system for monitoring at least one shipping container being transported by at least one cargo transport vehicle has a Container Security Device (CSD) configured to be removably coupled to the at least one freight shipping container wall thereby utilizing for monitoring a cargo inside the container and detection of intrusion violations accompanied with partial destruction of the container wall when in a coupled condition. The CSD including at least one anti-tamper sensor, a microcontroller and a communication device; where the microcontroller generates an alarm signal based on a signal from at least one anti-tamper sensor is subjected to an individual sensor processing procedure and then to an integrated sensor processing procedure, the integrated sensor processing procedure make determination of the overall container alert status based on the alarm signal from at least one sensor. The system also has a Network Operations Center (NOC), the NOC including a NOC communications facility configured to communicate with at least one telecommunication network, the NOC being configured to receive data from each of the plurality of the CSDs and including a data storage medium configured to store sensor data and contained an archive of the container events.

This application claims the priority filing date from the previouslyfiled provisional application Ser. No. US60/648,260 filed on Jan. 28,2005.

BACKGROUND

The vast majority of goods shipped throughout the world are shipped viawhat are referred to as intermodal freight containers. As used herein,the term “container” includes any container (with or without wheelsattached) that is not transparent to radio frequency signals, includingbut not limited to, intermodal freight containers. The most commoninternational freight containers are known as International StandardOrganization (ISO) dry intermodal containers, meaning they meet certainspecific dimensional, mechanical and other standards issued by the ISOto facilitate global trade. These containers have specific dimensional,mechanical and other standards issued by the ISO to facilitate globaltrade by encouraging development and use of compatible standardizedcontainers, handling equipment, ocean-going vessels, railroad equipmentand over-the-road equipment throughout the world for all modes ofsurface transportation of goods. The are currently more than 12 millionsuch containers in active circulation around the world as well as manymore specialized containers such as refrigerated containers that carryperishable commodities. The United States alone receives approximatelysix million loaded containers per year, or approximately 17,000 per day,representing nearly half of the total value of the total value of allgoods received each year. Since approximately 90% of all goods shippedinternationally are moved in containers, container transport has becomethe backbone of the world economy.

Cargo loss due to theft has become a serious problem. Cargo is oftenmisappropriated by shipping company employees, cargo handlers, and/orsecurity personal. Many insurance professionals believe that more thanhalf of all major cargo thefts are planned in logistics departments, byemployees at the shipper or manufacturer who are thought to betrustworthy. Certain authorities believe that gangs operating in manymetropolitan areas are actually training some of their members inlogistics so that they will be eligible for employment at desirabletrucking, warehousing or forwarding firms.

Because of the emergence of terrorist threats and activities, containersecurity has become a national security issue. Terrorists are exploitingtransportation modalities such as air, rail, truck-trailer, vessel-bargeand bus. As evidenced by recent attacks, terrorists are directing, orseeking to direct, mobile transportation assets into office buildingand/or other heavily populated areas.

Shipping containers may also be used by terrorists for the armsshipments. Of greatest concern is the shipment of nuclear, chemical, orbiological materials that can be used to produce weapons of massdestruction. Some of these materials are relatively small in size andcould be hidden in shipping containers without being detected bygovernmental authorities. If such weapons were to fall into the wronghands the results could be devastating.

With the above scenarios in mind, improving container security isdesired. In one approach that is commonly in use, a locking mechanism orsecurity seal are applied to container doors, to seal the cargo withinthe container. However, anyone who possesses the key or the combination,whether authorized or not, may gain access to the interior of acontainer. Further, the locks can be easily picked or removed by othermeans. Thus, locking devices are a limited deterrent to thieves orterrorists.

In another approach an electronic seal (“e-seal”) may be applied to acontainer. These e-seals are similar to traditional door seals andapplied to the containers via the same, albeit weak, door haspmechanism. These e-seals include an electronic device, such as a radioor radio reflective device, that can transmit the e-seal's serial numberand a signal if the e-seal is cut or broken after installation. However,the e-seal does not communicate with the interior or contents of thecontainer and does not transmit information related to the interior orcontents to other devices.

The e-seal typically employs either a low power radio transceiver oruses radio frequency backscatter techniques to convey information froman e-seal to a reader installed at, for example, a terminal gate. Theradio frequency backscatter technique involves use of a relativelyexpensive, narrow band, high-power radio technology based on acombination of radar and radiobroadcast technologies. The radiofrequency backscatter technology requires that a reader send a radiosignal of relatively high transmitted power (i.e., 0.5-3 W) that isreflected or scattered back to the reader with modulated or encoded datafrom the e-seal.

Furthermore, the e-seals are not effective at monitoring security of thecontainer. For example, other methods of intrusion into the containermay occur (e.g. breaching other parts of the container such as the sidewalls). Further, a biological agent may be implanted into the containerthrough the container's standard air vents.

SUMMARY

Present world wide transportation security system (transportationsecurity system) provides cost effective and reliable system of andmethod for: (1) registering any event in connection with breach of anywall in a container; (2) detecting an opening, a closing and a removalof the container's doors; (3) monitoring the condition of all seals andlocks on the container; (4) monitoring a cargo conditions inside thecontainer; (5) detecting human or an animal inside the container; (6)monitoring the container's movement; (7) detecting weapons of massdestruction in the container; (8) registration of movement inside thecontainer; (9) measuring cargo weight inside the container; (10)registering environmental parameters inside the container (temperature,humidity, smoke . . . etc.); and (11) simultaneously providing means fortracking movements of the container for reasons of security and logisticefficiency. The integrity system may generate false alarms with theprobability equal to or better than of 10⁻⁵:10⁻⁶.

The transportation security system provides intermodal threatidentification, detection, and notification transportation securitysystem. The transportation security system may be applied to alltranspiration modalities including air, rail, truck, ship, barge and bustransport modes. The instant security system provides inexpensive meansto monitoring each shipping container. Container tempering may bedetected and reported rapidly. Thus, present transportation securitysystem could be a credible defense mechanism against terrorist attemptsto smuggle weapons, weapons materials, and/or terrorist personnel bypreventing unauthorized access to shipping containers. The threat ofcargo theft or piracy is also mitigated. Thus, present transportationsecurity system provides governmental and law enforcement agencies withthe means to respond, in real-time, to cargo theft, piracy, and/orterrorist attacks.

One aspect of the present application is security system for monitoringat least one shipping container. The system includes a ContainerSecurity Device (CSD) configured to be removably coupled to the at leastone shipping container the CSD monitors a cargo inside the container anddetects intrusion the container. The CSD includes at least oneanti-tamper sensor, a microcontroller and a communication device. Themicrocontroller generates an alert status based on an output signalsfrom at least one sensor. The output signals may be subjected to anindividual sensor processing procedure and then to an integrated sensorprocessing procedure. The integrated sensor processing procedure makes adecision of the container alert status based on the output status of theat least one sensor. A Network Operations Center (NOC) includes a NOCcommunications facility configured to communicate with at least onetelecommunication network. The NOC being configured to receive data fromone or more CSDs. The NOC includes a data storage medium configured tostore sensor data and contained an archive of the container events.

In another aspect, the present application includes a transportationsecurity system for monitoring a plurality of shipping containers beingtransported by a plurality of cargo transport vehicles. Each of theplurality of cargo vehicles transports at least one shipping container.The system includes a CSD removably coupled to the at least one freightshipping container for monitoring a cargo inside the container anddetection of intrusion violations. The CSD includes at least one sensor.The CSD also includes a microcontroller and communication device. Thesystem may also include a plurality of bridges. Each bridge of theplurality of bridges may be disposed in one cargo transport vehicle.Each bridge may include a communication system being configured tocommunicate with the CSDs and a NOC. The bridge may also includes a datastorage medium configured to store data pertaining to container events.A NOC communicates with each of the plurality of bridges and CSDs. TheNOC may receive data from one or more of the plurality of bridges andCSDs. The NOC includes a data storage medium configured to store one ormore of sensor data and container events.

In another aspect, the present application includes a method formonitoring at least one shipping container being transported by at leastone cargo transport vehicle. The method includes providing a CSDconfigured to be removably coupled to the at least one shippingcontainer for monitoring a cargo inside the container and detectingintrusion violations. The CSD includes at least one sensor. The CSDincludes a microcontroller and a CSD communications device. The methodmay also include sending output data obtained from at least one sensorto the microcontroller.

In another aspect, the present application includes a method formonitoring at least one shipping container being transported by at leastone cargo transport vehicle from a point of origin to a destinationpoint. The method includes providing route data corresponding to thepath traversed by at least one cargo transport vehicle from a point oforigin to a destination point. An actual position of at least one cargovehicle is monitored to determine whether the actual position of thevehicle corresponds to the route data. An alert status condition isgenerated when the actual position of the vehicle does not correspond tothe route data. A NOC is notified of the alert status.

In another aspect, the present application includes a computer readablemedium having stored thereon a data structure for packetizing datatransmitted between a CSD and a bridge. The CSD being removably coupledto at least one shipping container disposed on a cargo transportvehicle. The bridge is disposed on the cargo transport vehicle. The datastructure includes: a container CSD identification field containing datathat uniquely identifies the container CSD; and a field containingeither CSD status data or bridge command data depending on a course ofthe packet.

In another aspect, the present application includes a computer readablemedium having stored thereon a data structure for packetizing data beingtransmitted between a bridge and a NOC. The bridge being configured tomonitor at least one container CSD configured to be removably coupled tothe at least one freight shipping container disposed on a cargotransport vehicle. The bridge being disposed on the cargo transportvehicle. The data structure includes: a bridge identification fieldcontaining data that uniquely identifies the container CSD; and a fieldcontaining either bridge-status or the NOC command data depending on thesource of the packet.

In another aspect, the present application includes a personalconditions monitoring system. The system includes a monitoring module.The monitoring module includes sensor array and ADC. The system includesa communication subsystem and a power subsystem with replaceablebatteries. The communication subsystem includes transceiver and antenna.

Additional features and advantages of the invention will be set forth inthe detailed description which follows, and in part will be readilyapparent to those skilled in the art from that description or recognizedby practicing the invention as described herein, including the detaileddescription which follows, the claims and the drawings.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

FIG. 1 shows one exemplary transportation security system in accordancewith one embodiment.

FIG. 2 is a block diagram of the transportation security system depictedin FIG. 1.

FIG. 3 is a block diagram of a Container Security Device (CSD).

FIG. 4 is a flowchart illustrating one exemplary method for detectingand registering a container intrusion signal.

FIG. 5 is a flowchart of method for detecting and registering acontainer intrusion signal by accelerometer.

FIG. 6 is a flowchart of method for detecting and registering acontainer intrusion signal by a light sensor.

FIG. 7 is a flowchart of method for detecting and registering acontainer intrusion signal by a strain gage.

FIG. 8 is a flowchart of method for detecting and registering acontainer intrusion signal by a smoke detector.

FIG. 9 is a flowchart of method for detecting and registering acontainer intrusion signal by a humidity sensor.

FIG. 10 is a flowchart of method for detecting and registering acontainer intrusion signal by a temperature sensor.

FIG. 11 is a flowchart of method for detecting and registering acontainer intrusion signal by a door-opening sensor.

FIG. 12 is a flowchart of method for detecting and registering acontainer intrusion signal by a microphone.

FIG. 13 is a flowchart of method for detecting and registering acontainer intrusion signal by a UMPR.

FIG. 14 is a schematic diagram illustrating exemplary parameters formeasuring a digital signature.

FIG. 15 show a cross-sectional view of one exemplary Mass-tomograph inaccordance with one embodiment.

FIG. 16 shows a cross-sectional view of the Mass-tomograph depicted inFIG. 15 when the container is steady.

FIG. 17 shows a cross-sectional view of the Mass-tomograph depicted inFIG. 15 when the container is moving.

FIG. 18 shows a block diagram of one exemplary bridge.

FIG. 19 shows a block diagram of the bridge, depicted in FIG. 18, whenstationary.

FIG. 20 shows a block diagram of one exemplary portative bridge depictedin FIG. 18.

FIG. 21 shows a block diagram of one exemplary service bridge depictedin FIG. 18.

FIG. 22 shows a diagramed depiction of one exemplary Network OperationsCenter depicted in FIG. 1.

FIG. 23 shows a diagramed depiction of one exemplary NOC server depictedin FIG. 22.

FIG. 24 shows a flowchart showing one exemplary method for monitoringcontainer integrity.

FIG. 25 shows a diagramed depiction of personal conditions monitoringsystem.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

FIG. 1 shows one exemplary transportation security system 100 inaccordance with one embodiment. Each mode of transportation (e.g.,transportation by ship) is monitored and tracked using transportationsecurity system 100. A ship 110 is illustratively shown carrying aplurality of shipping containers 130. Each shipping container 130 has aContainer Security Device (“CSD”) 140 that communicates with a NetworkOperations Center (“NOC”) 170, preferably via a Bridge 150. When the CSD140 detects a break-in violation, an alert status is generated andtransmitted to NOC 170, via the Bridge 150. The CSD 140 communicateswith the Bridge 150 using an Unlicensed International Frequency BandLocal Area Communication Network 160C. However, if the CSD 140 unable tocommunicate with the NOC 170 through the Bridge 150, the CSD 140 maycommunicate with the NOC 170 via a cellular communications channel 160Aor a satellite communication channel 160B. The alert status generated bythe CSD 140, when onboard a ship for example, includes the identity ofthe container 130, in which also is located, the location of the ship110, the time and date of the alert status generation, and a descriptionof the alert status. The NOC 170, upon receipt of the alert status, mayeither confirm or reject the alert status. If the alert status isconfirmed, the NOC 170 may generate an alarm signal.

FIG. 2 is a block diagram further illustrating the transportationsecurity system 100 of FIG. 1. In particular, FIG. 2 illustrativelyshows communication between CSD 140, NOC 170 and Bridge 150 in furtherdetail. In this example, the CSD 140 is shown communicating with the NOC170 via cellular 160A or satellite 160B communications. The Bridge 150is also shown communicate with the NOC 170 via cellular 160A orsatellite 160B connection. The Bridge 150 may also communicate with theNOC 170 via an Ethernet connection 160D, for example.

FIG. 3 is a block diagram illustrates one exemplary CSD 300. CSD 300may, for example, represent CSD 140 of FIG. 1. The CSD 300 includes aSensor Block 310, a local alert mechanism 320, a Microcontroller 330, aGPS receiver 340, a Cellular Modem 350A, a Satellite Modem 350B, awireless LAN (WLAN) Interface 350C, an Antenna Block 360 and a PowerUnit 370. The WLAN Interface 350C uses one of the standard typeUnlicensed International Frequency transceiver like Bluetooth Zigbeeetc.

The Sensor Block 310 is illustratively shown with a Light Sensor 310A, aCapacity Proximity Sensor 310B, an Accelerometer 310C, a Micro PowerRadar (MPR) 310D, an Inductive Sensor 310E, a RFID reader 310F, a StrainGage 310G. The Sensor Block 310 may also include one or more of: aPiezosensor 310H, an Ultrasonic Sensor 310I, a Microphone 310P, anUltrasound Micropower Radar (UMPR) 310J, an Infrared Sensor 310K, a DoorOpening Sensor 310L, a Seal Break Sensor 310M, a Sensor controlparameters of surrounding 310N, as shown in FIG. 4. Sensor controlparameters of surroundings 310N may include one or more of: aTemperature Sensor, a Smoke Detector Sensor, a Humidity Sensor, etc. TheAntenna block 360 includes a GPS antenna 360A, a Cellular antenna 360B,a Satellite antenna 360C, and a low power LAN antenna 360D.

In one example of operation, microcontroller 330 monitors output ofsensor block 310 to determine an alert status. If an alert status isdetermined, microcontroller 330 may provide Cellular modem 350A,Satellite modem 350B and/or LAN interface 350C with a formatted messagepacket. This message packet may, for example, be transmitted from theAntenna block 360 to either the Bridge 150 or the NOC 170. Transmissionmessage packets from the Bridge 150 and/or the NOC 170 (see FIG. 1 andFIG. 2) are received by the Antenna block 360 and directed to one ormore of the Cellular modem 350A, the Satellite modem 350B and the LANinterface 350C. Microcontroller 330 may then process the Bridge 150and/or the NOC 170 message packet to receive information and/orinstructions from the NOC 170, for example.

FIG. 4 is a flowchart illustrating one exemplary method 399 fordetecting and registering container intrusion signals (e.g., alertstatuses). Accelerometer 310C, Piezosensor 310H and Ultrasonic sensor310I, Microphone 310P output signals are monitored by themicrocontroller 330, which thus identifies sensors 310 that exceed oneor more pre-set threshold levels.

Once the container 130 is loaded with its payload, the microcontroller330 operates in a calibration mode. The container's 130 walls may bestruck several time and ‘images’ of these hits may be recorded andstored in a pulling library of images 425 in the microcontroller 330 foruse as calibration images pertaining to this particular container 130.In one example, one or more exemplary images of intrusion or damage tothe container 130 may also be stored in the library of images 425.

The microcontroller 330 identifies signals that exceed certain thresholdlevels. These signals may be separated by microcontroller 330, in Step400, into a single hit signal 405 and/or a series of hit signals 407.Within the microcontroller 330, a Short Time Fast Fourier Analysis isused to process the single hit signal 405, in Step 410, and a Waveletanalysis may also be performed, in Step 415. An image of the single hitsignal is then created. Correlation Functions in Step 420 and Theory ofSample Recognition in Step 430, are utilized to compare the hit image tothe exemplary images stored within the library of images 425. If themicrocontroller 330 determines that the single hit image correlates withto the images of intrusion into a damaged container, a majority votingalgorithm is applied to the single hit image. The majority votingalgorithm is a part of an integrated sensor processing procedure 470.

The majority voting algorithm is based on major voting mark of unrelatedcriteria. Each criteria may be assigned positive and/or negative points.When the majority voting algorithm is applied to the image of the singlehit signal the decision about intrusion attempt is based on votingprocess based on sum of all points given during processing of the hitsignal image. If the sum of total points given to the hit signal imageindicates that an intrusion attempt took place, the single hit image isfurther subjected to the integrated sensor processing procedure 470,which makes a decision as to if intrusion occurred.

The majority voting algorithm may also be applied to the series of hitsignals 407 in Step 470. If the sum of total points given duringprocessing of the series of hit signals 407 indicates that intrusion, oreven an intrusion attempt, occurred, the series of hit signals 407 aresubjected to an integrated sensor processing procedure 470 which makes adecision as to if the intrusion occurred.

If the data processed by integrated sensor processing procedure 470 isincomplete or inconsistent, this data is sent by the CSD 140 to the NOC170 for a further analysis. In this case the NOC 170 (i.e., not the CSD140) will make the decision as to if intrusion occurred.

The microcontroller 330 may also utilize correlation functions 420 tocompare output from the Accelerometer 310C and other sensors like thePiezosensor 310H and/or the Ultrasonic sensor 310I to an exemplary imagethat corresponds to a signal generating by a metal cutting instrument,for example, stored in the library of images 425. If, in Step 420, themicrocontroller 330 determines that the intrusion signal 420 correlatesto the stored signal image generated by a metal cutting instrument 425,the intrusion signal is then further subjected to an integrated sensorprocessing procedure 470 that makes a decision as to if the intrusiontook place.

Output signals from the accelerometer 310C may also be monitored bymicrocontroller 330 to detect vibration of the container wall. Once avibration signal 402 of the container wall is detected by themicrocontroller 330, the microcontroller 330 may process, in step 403,the vibration signal 402 to produce a wavelet analysis and a “window”Fourier analysis for comparison, in step 440, to one or more recordedimages of library of images 425 to determine which mode oftransportation is used to move the container 130. The integrated sensorprocessing procedure 470 may then be applied to these signals todetermine the mode of transport or if an intrusion took place.

An output signal from the light sensor's 310A may be monitored by themicrocontroller 330 to determine intrusion or fire. For example, if themicrocontroller 330 determines that the output signal indicates that themeasured light within the container exceeds a certain rate of changethreshold, the microcontroller 330 may initiate further analysis of theoutput signal, and/or other sensor signals, to determine if an intrusionis occurring, and/or if there is presence of smoke. If themicrocontroller 330 determines that an intrusion has occurred and/orsmoke is present, the output signal may be subjected to furtherprocessing by the integrated sensor procedure 470 to make the decisionthat intrusion occurred or not.

Output signals from the capacitive proximity sensor's 310B, Strain gage310G and RFID reader 310F outputs also may be monitored by themicrocontroller 330 to detect addition or removal of objects from thecontainer 130. The output signals may, for example, be analyzed by themicrocontroller 330, Step 445, to detect change in the cargo mass. Ifchange in cargo mass is detected, the capacitive proximity sensor outputmay be subjected to the integrated sensor processing procedure 470 whichmakes a decision about the alert status of the container 130.

An output signal from the capacitive proximity's sensor 310B may bemonitored by the microcontroller 330 to determine if any objects are inclose proximity to locks and seals of the container 130. If any objectsare detected in close proximity to the locks and the seals of thecontainer 130, the output signals from one or more sensors may befurther analyzed within the microcontroller 330 to determine if abreak-in has occurred. If a break-in is detected by the microcontroller330, further analysis of these signals may be made by the integratedsensor processing procedure 470 to make a decision as to if an intrusionoccurred.

Output signals from sensors are monitored by the microcontroller 330 incontrol parameters of surrounding 310N. These sensors may, for example,include a temperature sensor that produces an output signal which may bemonitored by the microcontroller 330 to detect thermal excursionsoutside one or more predetermined temperature ranges and/or to detectrates of change in temperature that occur outside one or more predefinedrates of change. If, for example, the microcontroller 330 determinesthat the sensed temperature is outside predetermined temperature rangesand/or that the rate of temperature change if outside thesepredetermined limits, output signals from one or more sensors will befurther analyzed by the integrated sensor procedure 470 to decide if anintrusion occurred.

In another example, an output signal from the smoke detector sensor maybe monitored to determine if chemicals are present within the air,and/or air clarity inside the container 130 exceeds a predefinedthreshold level. If, for example, a chemical is detected within the air,output signals from one or more sensors will be further analyzed by theintegrated sensor processing procedure 470 to make decision as to thecontainer 130 alert status.

In another example, an output signal from the UMPR 310J may be monitoredby the microcontroller 330 to detect presence of humans or animalswithin the container 130. If, for example, presence of humans and/oranimals is detected, the output signals from one or more sensors may befurther processed by the integrated sensor procedure 470 to make adecision as to if an intrusion occurred. The UMPR 310J may, for example,utilize the Doppler's effect to detect movement inside the container130. The UMPR 310J may, for example include an ultrasonic transceiver.This sensor may also be used to detect force entry attempts into thecontainer 130, based upon registration of impact drilling, gas cutting,etc., by utilization of the UMPR 310J as a highly sensitive UMPR-basedmicrophone. The later purpose is accomplished by applying a procedure todetermine, in Step 460, the integrity of the container's wall. If theUMPR 310J output data exceeds the threshold determined in Steps 460 and465, application of a procedure to determines the integrity of the wallsand the cargo movement inside the container 130 may be applied. Theoutput data of one or more sensors may then be further analyzed withinthe microcontroller 330 for presence of humans/animals or presence ofwall integrity failure. If, for example, presence of humans/animalsand/or wall destruction are detected, the output signals from one ormore sensors 310 are subjected to the integrated sensor procedure 470 tomake a decision as to if an intrusion occurred.

Output signals from sensor MPR 310D may be processed to produce aradioprint (e.g., radio-imprint) based upon locations of the objectsinside the container 130. The process of development of devices ofradio-imprint described in the Appendixes A. This radioprint may bemonitored by microcontroller 330 to detect deviations in objectlocation, by comparing the radioprint to an initial radio print recordedduring calibration, for example. Radioprints are build based on theanalysis of all reflected signals, including signals reflected byobjects that are not located in the direct field of the sensor. If, forexample, microcontroller 330 detects deviation between a currentradioprint and the radioprint recorded during calibration, theradioprints and output signals from other sensors may be subjected tothe integrated sensor processing procedure 470 to determine if anintrusion occurred.

Output signals from the infrared sensor's 310K may be monitored by themicrocontroller 330 to detect warm objects within the container. If, forexample, the microcontroller 330 detects a warm object, the outputsignal from one or more sensors may be further analyzed, in Step 465,within the microcontroller 330 to determine the presence of humans oranimals by applying procedures that determines movement inside thecontainer 130. If, for example, humans or animals are detected, outputsignals from one or more sensors may be subjected to the integratedprocedure 470 to make a decision as to if an intrusion occurred.

An output signal from the GPS receiver 340 may be monitored to determinea location of the CSD 140, and further to determine if this locationdiffers from a programmed route for the container 130. If, for example,the microcontroller 330 determines that the current location differsfrom the programmed route, the output signal may be further analyzed, inStep 435, to determine deviation from the programmed route. If, forexample, significant deviation from the programmed route is detected,the output signals from one or more sensors may be subjected to theintegrated sensor processing procedure 470 to make a decision as to ifan intrusion occurred.

In another example, the door opening sensor 310L and the seal breaksensor 310M are monitored by the microcontroller 330 to detect changesin integrity of the doors and seals of the container 130. If themicrocontroller 330 detects changes in integrity, the output signalsfrom one or more sensors may be subjected to the integrated sensorprocessing procedure 470 to make a decision as to if an intrusionoccurred.

Considering the workload and low performance of standalone CSDmicroprocessor stemming from strict limitations to its powerconsumption, a simple accelerometer signal analysis algorithm couldoften be employed to determine impacts against the structure of securedcontainer.

FIG. 5 illustrates a flowchart of method for detecting and registering acontainer intrusion signal by accelerometer. In order to save CSD power,accelerometer indications are monitored in two modes: Standby andActive. In Standby mode, accelerometers are being checked in equal timeperiods, with frequency F1 about 100 Hz in, instead of constantmonitoring. Sensors go offline between checkpoints, and module'smicrocontroller, if not being used, enters sleep mode.

In Standby, the accelerometer's 310C indications are read in timeintervals dT=1/F1 in Step 501. Then the accelerometer 310C is turned onand the microcontroller 330 is in Active mode in Step 502. Then theaccelerometer's values are taken in Step 503. In Step 504 theaccelerometer 310C is turned off. Based on values obtained, an absolutevalue of apparent acceleration vector A=√{square root over (A_(X)²+A_(Y) ²+A_(Z) ²)} and its deviation from gravity vector D=A−1 aredetermined in Step 505. If D does not exceed preset threshold P1 shownin Step 506, the CSD 140 remains in Standby show in Step 507, otherwiseit enters Active mode of accelerometer indications monitoring. P1 shouldbe ˜0.5 g.

In Active mode, accelerometers remain online from the moment of modeentry show in Step 508 to the moment when D remains below P1 thresholdshown in Step 513 for N measurement cycles as show in Steps 514 and 515,when S (number of cycle when D less then P1) exceeds N, then this initself is the condition for exiting the Active mode as shown in Step516, then accelerometers 301C are turned off. D is measured anddetermined in each measurement cycle shown in Step 510 and Step 511 andits maximum value maxD is recorded as shown in Step 509. MaxD isverified upon exiting the Active mode. If the value MaxD exceeds P2threshold as shown in Step 517, the majority algorithm of the integratedsensor processing procedure 470 indicates an impact against container'sstructure and time and amplitude of hit have fixed value as shown inStep 518. If, however, the value MaxD does not exceed the threshold P2microcontroller returns into the Standby mode as shown in Step 519.

FIG. 6 illustrates a flowchart of method for detecting and registering acontainer intrusion signal by a light sensor. The algorithm is used todetermine breaking in the container by changed light intensity insidethe container as the result of both penetration of outside light andlight flashes occurring in metal cutting tools operation.

The light sensor's 310A indications are read and analyzed with frequencyabout 3 Hz as show in Step 601. Sampled sensor signal A is filtered outand errors due to random deviations of sensor indications are eliminatedas shown in Step 602. Filtered signal A^(F) is compared in two stageswith original sensor readings A*. If A^(F) exceeds A* by more than 2% asshow in Step 603, the integrated sensor procedure 470 reports potentialbreaking in the container as show in Step 609. If A^(F) exceeds A* bymore than 5% as shown in Step 604, the integrated sensor procedure 470reports the break in the container 130 as shown in Step 605. However, ifA^(F) does not exceed A* by more than 5% as shown in Step 604 theintegrated sensor processing procedure 470 reports high chance ofbreaking in the container as show in Step 609. Light sensor isrecalibrated every 15 minutes in the process of its monitoring as showin Steps 606, 607, 608 and 610. Recalibration is required becausecontainers are not hermetically sealed, due to which light intensityinside of them could change in changing outside light conditions (atday/night).

FIG. 7 illustrates a flowchart of method for detecting and registering acontainer intrusion signal by a strain gage. The algorithm is used torecord damage (alterations) to container structure.

The strain gage 310G is queued with frequency about 1 kHz in 15 ms longsessions shown in Step 701. Vector of measured results A_(<15>) ismedian filtered as shown in Step 702. Measurement sessions occur withfrequency about 3 Hz. Filtered signal A^(F) is compared in two stageswith original sensor readings A*. If A^(F) exceeds A* by more than 1% asshow in Step 703, the integrated sensor processing procedure 470 reportspotential damage to container structure as shown in Step 707. If A^(F)exceeds A* by more than 3% as shown in Step 704, the integrated sensorprocessing procedure 470 reports the break in the container 130 as shownin Step 708. However, if A^(F) doe not exceed A* by more than 3% asshown in Step 704, the integrated sensor processing procedure 470reports potential damage to container structure as shown in Step 707.Strain gage is recalibrated hourly in the process of its monitoring asshown in Steps 705, 706, 709 and 710. This is required because changingambient temperature (at day/night) causes strain of metal containerwalls.

FIG. 8 illustrates a flowchart of method for detecting and registering acontainer intrusion by s smoke detector sensor. The algorithm is used todetermine smoke content in the container due to fire or breaking inusing metal cutting instruments.

The smoke detector sensor's 310N indications are read and analyzed withfrequency about 0.1 Hz shown in Step 801. Sampled sensor signal A isfiltered out and errors due to random deviations of sensor indicationsare eliminated shown in Step 802. Filtered signal A^(F) is compared intwo stages with original sensor readings A*. If A^(F) exceeds A* by morethan 3% shown in Step 803, the integrated sensor processing procedure470 reports potential smoke content inside the container shown in Step805. If A^(F) exceeds A* by more than 10%, the integrated sensorprocessing procedure reports smoke content inside the container shown inStep 806. However, if A^(F) does not exceed A* by more than 10%, theintegrated sensor processing procedure 470 reports potential smokecontent inside the container shown in Step 805. The some detector sensor310N is calibrated once during activation of security module.

FIG. 9 illustrates a flowchart of method for detecting and registering acontainer intrusion signal by a humidity sensor. The algorithm is usedto record relative humidity inside the container.

The humidity sensor's 310N indications are read and analyzed withfrequency about 0.1 Hz as shown in Step 901. Sampled sensor signal isfiltered out and errors due to random deviations of sensor indicationsare eliminated shown in Step 902. Filtered signal passes two-stageevaluation. If relative humidity exceeds 85% as shown in Step 903, theintegrated sensor processing procedure 470 reports increased humidityinside the container shown in Step 906. If relative humidity exceeds 95%as shown in Step 904, the integrated sensor processing procedure reportshigh humidity inside the container as shown in Step 905. However, ifrelative humidity does not exceed 95% as shown in Step 904, theintegrated sensor processing procedure 470 reports increased humidityinside the container shown in Step 906.

FIG. 10 illustrates a flowchart of method for detecting and registeringa container intrusion signal by a temperature sensor. Aside fromrecording the temperature inside the container in order to manage cargostorage conditions, the algorithm is able to monitor the rate oftemperature change.

The temperature sensor's 310N indications are read and analyzed withfrequency about 0.3 Hz as shown in Step 1001. Sampled sensor signal A isfiltered out and errors due to random deviations of sensor indicationsare eliminated as shown in Step 1002. Filtered signal A^(F) is comparedin two stages with original sensor readings A*. If A^(F) exceeds A* bymore than 2° C. shown in Step 1003, the integrated sensor processingprocedure 470 reports temperature change inside the containers shown inStep 1007. If A^(F) exceeds A* by more than 5° C. as shown in Step 1006,the integrated signal processing procedure 470 reports drastic change oftemperature inside the container shown in Step 1009. However, if A^(F)does not exceed A* by more than 5° C. as shown in Step 1006, theintegrated sensor processing procedure 470 reports temperature changeinside the containers shown in Step 1007. Temperature sensor isrecalibrated every 15 minutes in the process of its monitoring shown inSteps 1004, 1005, 1008 and 1110. Recalibration is required becausecontainers heat up and cool down in a broad temperature range duringday/night cycle.

FIG. 11 illustrates a flowchart of method for detecting and registeringa container intrusion signal by an incremental door opening sensors. Inorder to obtain more reliable judgment, two sensors are installed percontainer door.

The door opening sensors 310L are queued with frequency 0.3 Hz. In orderto eliminate random errors, each sensor is queued thrice as shown inStep 1101, after which each sensor's condition is determined usingmajorization as part of the integrated sensor processing procedure 470as shown in Step 1102. Based on obtained values, a judgment is drawnabout condition of each container door as shown in Step 1103. If bothsensors indicate closed door as shown in Step 1104, the door is reportedto be closed. If both sensors indicate opened door as shown in Step1104, the door is reported to be opened as shown in Step 1106. If sensorindications are inconsistent, sensor signal processing procedure reportspotential opening of the door as shown in Step 1105.

FIG. 12 illustrates a flowchart of method for detecting and registeringa container intrusion signal by a microphone, which enables CSD torecord noise caused by container breaking tools, and to determinepossible type of tool.

The microphone 310P is queued in sessions in 2 second intervals. Thissaves CSD power while avoiding the danger of missing the noise of tools'operation. Measurement session T lasts 0.2 seconds as shown in Step1201. At the first level of examination, amplitude of microphone signalis verified across the entire frequency band. If input signal A_(inp) isbelow preset threshold A_(min) as shown in Step 1202, subsequent signalprocessing is skipped until next measurement cycle as shown in Step1201. Otherwise, power of received signal

$P_{A} = {\frac{1}{T}{\int_{T}{A_{inp}^{2}{\mathbb{d}t}}}}$is evaluated. If signal power exceeds preset threshold P_(A)>P_(min),judgment is drawn about presence of noise correspondent to breaking inthe container as shown in Step 1203. Second level of processing takesplace then, which includes spectrum analysis of signal power in order todetermine the type of tool used to break in the container as show inStep 1205. In this connection, bands exhibiting signal amplitude abovepreset threshold A_(inp) ^(f)>A_(min) ^(f) are gated out across theentire frequency range. Spectrum power of sound

$P_{f} = {\frac{1}{T\;\Delta\; F}{\int_{\Delta\; F}{\int_{T}{A_{inp}^{2}{\mathbb{d}t}{\mathbb{d}f}}}}}$is calculated for gated bandwidth ΔF. Through signal processing, aspectrum power array at different frequency bands S is generated. Eachcontainer-breaking tool is characterized by its own array of soundspectrum power S_(i)*, limited from below. Tool of breaking isdetermined in comparing arrays S and S_(i)*. If arrays S included in anarray of sound spectrum power S_(i) as shown in Step 1205, then breakingtook place and tool of breaking is recognized as shown in Step 1207.However, if arrays S is not included in an array of sound spectrum powerS_(i) as shown in Step 1205, then breaking took place but tool ofbreaking is unknown as shown in Step 1206.

FIG. 13 illustrates a flowchart of method of detecting and registering acontainer intrusion signal based on UMR. UMPR enables to construct aunique digital imprint of container interior, representing arrangementof items within radar coverage. The imprint would change reflectingchanges in arrangement of interior items.

In order to obtain the imprint, the UMPR 310J emits 2 ms long pulses inultrasonic frequency, such as 40 kHz as shown in Step 1301. Meanwhile,the UMPR 3103 receiver stays idle. Emitted signal reflects repeatedlyfrom container interior items and then returns to the UMPR 310J where itis received by ultrasonic receiver. Receiver goes online for 50 ms afterthe pulse has been sent as shown in Step 1302. Changes in amplitude ofreceived signal for this period are the imprint of container interior.

In order to compare obtained imprint against reference one (which wasobtained at the beginning of the trip and store in the pulling libraryof images 425), UMPR receiver signal is sampled with at least doublefrequency of emitted signal. Obtained set of N values Y_(<N>) iscompared against reference imprint X_(<N>) using correlation functionsas shown in Step 1303. For example, a function could be used based onsupposition that actual imprint could be represented on the referencebasis using correlation factors A and B and expressed as Y_(i)=AX_(i)+B.Correlation factors are derived from the system of equations

${A = \frac{{\sum\limits_{i = 1}^{N}{x_{i} \cdot {\sum\limits_{i = 1}^{N}y_{i}}}} - {N \cdot {\sum\limits_{i = 1}^{N}{x_{i} \cdot y_{i}}}}}{( {\sum\limits_{i = 1}^{N}x_{i}} )^{2} - {N \cdot {\sum\limits_{i = 1}^{N}x_{i}^{2}}}}};$$B = {\frac{1}{N} \cdot {( {{\sum\limits_{i = 1}^{N}y_{i}} - {A \cdot {\sum\limits_{i = 1}^{N}x_{i}}}} ).}}$Value of correlation function formulated using least squares method

$F = {\sum\limits_{i = 1}^{N}( {y_{i} - {A\; x_{i}} - B} )^{2}}$is compared against the limit F_(MAX), and if the limit is exceeded asshown in Step 1304, a judgment is drawn about changes in containerinterior as shown in Step 1305.

The accelerometers 310C, as shown in FIG. 3, are included within CSD 140and are used to create a Digital Signature (DS) and may be used toidentify location of cargo within the container. FIG. 14 is a schematicdiagram illustrating exemplary parameters that may be used to form thisDS. In FIG. 14, the following parameters characterizing a spatialdistribution of the container 130, where M is the mass of the cargo, Rmrepresents the coordinates of the center of mass within the body frame,which is strictly connected with the container itself, Ix, Iy, Iz arecomponents of the container moment of inertia, which characterize themass distribution with respect to the center of mass.

DS is thus defined by this parameters set which may define the expectedmotion of the container. Changes in one or more of these measuredparameters may, therefore, correspond to certain events during cargotransportation. For example, if DS has not changed, the cargo is intact.If, M and Ix, Iy, Iz are the same but Rm has changed, the cargo may notbe stolen or damaged, but may have moved within the container 130 (i.e.,the coordinates of the center of mass Rm change as the cargo moveswithin the container). It may, therefore, be necessary to checkfastenings of the cargo within the container. If, for example, parameterM does not change, but parameters Ix, Iy, Iz and Rm have changed, it isprobably that the cargo has not been stolen (it can be preciselydetermined based on the degree of the parameters change). However, it isalso possible that a partial destruction of the cargo took place (e.g.,damage resulting from inaccurate unloading). Change of the moment ofinertia with respect to the center of mass may occur due to thisdestruction. If all parameters of the DS have changed, it is likely thatthe container has been tampered with. The determination of DS allows notonly to reveal theft without opening the container, but may also providecontinual monitoring of the cargo's condition.

The accelerometers 310C, as shown in FIG. 3, that are included withinthe CSD 140, form a Mass-tomograph 1500, as shown in FIG. 15. Theplurality of accelerometers that form the Mass-tomograph are coupled towalls of the container 130. The Mass-tomograph 1500 is used to constructa spatial picture of mass distribution within the container 130. Inparticular, FIG. 15 shows a cross-sectional view of one exemplaryMass-tomograph 1500 in accordance with one embodiment. Mass-tomograph1500 may, for example, be used to subtract effects of the surroundingson the accelerometers measurements. The initial calibration ofaccelerometers may occur without any cargo in the container. A secondround of measurements may occur when an object or a cargo (e.g., cargo1510) is placed inside the container 130. The calibration measurementsof the accelerometers are subtracted from the second round ofmeasurements to eliminate influence of the container itself, and theaccelerometer measurements are thus only determined for the object 1510mass.

FIG. 16 shows a cross-sectional view of one exemplary Mass-tomograph1600 that is external to container 130 and when the container 130 is insteady position. In this embodiment, the Mass-tomograph is used as adevice to obtain imaging of the contents of the container. In thisexample, the mass-tomograph 1600 monitors the whole container 130. Whenthe container 130 is in the steady position the quality of the spatialmass distribution of the container mass depends on two parameters: theaccuracy of accelerometers and the distance, laccel 1620, betweenadjacent accelerometers 310C that form the Mass-tomograph 1600.

FIG. 17 shows a cross-sectional view of one exemplary Mass-tomograph1700 when the container 130 is moving. Mass-tomograph 1700 may, forexample represent mass-tomograph 1600, FIG. 16. In this example, themass-tomograph 1700 scans the container 130, as the container 130 movesgradually through the Mass-tomograph 1700; in this example the container130 moves with a steady speed Vcont 1720. In this example, a highquality spatial mass distribution inside the container 130 may bedetermined, since the quality of spatial mass distribution depends onlyon the accuracy of accelerometers; the perceived distance laccel 1620between adjacent accelerometers will be minimal due to the movement ofthe container.

When the CSD 140 determines an overall container alert signal based onthe decision of the integrated sensor processing procedure 470, shown inFIG. 4, the microcontroller 330 activates one or more local alertmechanisms (e.g., sound devices 320A and/or light device 320B, as shownin FIG. 3) that generate a local alarm signal. The microcontroller 330may also activate transceivers 350A-350C to transmit a message thatincludes this alert via antennas 360B-360D to the Bridge 150 and/or theNOC 170. The microcontroller 330 also determines time intervals used toactivate the transceivers 350A-350C during communication with the Bridge150 or the NOC 170. In one example, these time intervals may bedetermined by the NOC 170.

The CSD 140 may be coupled to the wall of the container 130 by RareEarth Magnets, Double-Stick Tape and/or Hot-Glue.

The power unit 370 of the CSD 140, as shown in FIG. 3, may include oneor more storage batteries 370A. The power unit 370 may also beconfigured to receive electrical power from a power source of the cargotransport vehicle. In this case, if the power source is interrupted, thepower unit 370 may revert to use of the storage batteries 370A and/orSolar power, for example. In the event of a power interruption or if thestorage battery charge falls below a threshold level, the CSD 140 maytransmit, via antennas 360, a power interrupt alarm to the Bridge 150and/or the NOC 170.

The microcontroller 330 may also implement power-management techniquesto reduce power consumption. For example, one or more time window(s) maybe specified, during initialization process or via transceivers350A-350C, to define activation times for one or more components of CSD140. When not operating, (i.e., when outside the specified time windows,the CSD 140 may switch into a sleep (suspend) mode to avoid unnecessarypower utilization. In fact, sleep mode may account for a significantpart of the life of the CSD 140; the CSD 140 may operate over severalyears without need of storage battery replacement. In one example ofoperation, the CSD 140 remains awake (i.e., does not switch to sleepmode) when communicating with the Bridge 150 and/or the NOC 170. If theCSD 140 does not receive a signal from the Bridge 150 or the NOC 170,the CSD 140 will only stay awake as long as necessary to insure that nosignal is present during a time windows specified. The CSD 140 may alsoswitch from sleep to awake mode if any one anti-tamper sensor of block310 exceeds a certain threshold level.

FIG. 18 shows a block diagram illustrating one exemplary Bridge 1800.Bridge 1800 may, for example, represent bridge 150 of FIG. 1. The Bridge1800 includes a Microcontroller unit 1810, GPS receiver 1830, CellularModem 1840A, Satellite Modem 1840B, WLAN Interface 1840C, Ethernetinterface 1850A, User interface 1850B, External connection interface1850C, Antennas Block 1860 and Power Unit 1870. The block of Antennas1860 includes GPS antenna 1860A, Cellular antenna 1860B, Satelliteantenna 1860C, and International Frequency Band Local Area Communicationantenna 1860D. The Cellular modem 1840A is utilized to communicate withthe NOC 170 via cellular communication channel 160A, for example. TheSatellite modem 1840B is utilized to communicate with the NOC 170 viasatellite communication channel 160B, for example. The WLAN interface1840C is utilized to communicate with the CSD 140 via LAN 160C. The CSD140 communicates to the NOC 170 via the Bridge 1800. Communication fromthe CSD 140 to the NOC 170 is less costly when the Bridge 1800 isutilized to relay the communication. In one example, it saves energycompare to when the CSD communicates with the NOC 170 directly viacellular or satellite communications channels. In one example, the CSD140 transmits the system status, including any alert status, to theBridge 1800 upon request of the NOC 170.

The Bridge's 1800 includes a power unit 1870 which may receive powerfrom a power network 1870B. In the event that this power network 1870Bis interrupted, power unit 1870 may be configured to switch over toutilize Storage batteries 1870A. This power interruption may be detectedby the microcontroller unit 1810, for example, which may transmit analarm message to the NOC 170. The alarm message may, for example,identify the bridge 1800 by an identification code, the location of theship provided by the GPS receiver 1830, the date and time of the alarm,and further description of the alarm event (e.g., loss of ship's power).

FIG. 19 shows a block diagram of one exemplary Stationary Bridge 1900according to one embodiment. The Stationary Bridge 1900 may be placed inthe areas of high container concentration, such as places ofconsolidation/deconsolidation of containers, ports, terminals, etc.Stationary Bridge 1900 may be used for continuous communication with theNOC 170. Stationary Bridge 1900 includes the WLAN Interface 1910 and theEthernet interface 1920. Stationary Bridge 1900 may not include a userinterface. Further, since the geographical location of the StationaryBridge 1900 remains the same, it may not require a GPS receiver.

FIG. 20 shows a block diagram of one exemplary Portative Bridge 2000according to one embodiment. The Portative Bridge 2000 may be used wherecontainers are transported, such as on ships, trains, etc. The PortativeBridge 2000 includes a GPS receiver 2010, a Cellular Modem 2020A, aSatellite modem 2020B, a WLAN 2020C, an External connection interface2030 and an Antenna Block 2060. In communicating with the NOC 170, thePortative Bridge 2000 uses cellular 160A and satellite 160Bcommunication channels. The Portative Bridge 2000 may not have a userinterface.

FIG. 21 shows a block diagram of one exemplary Service Bridge 2100according to one embodiment. The Service Bridge 2100 may be used tosupport and communicate with one or more CSDs 140. The Service Bridge2100 may include a cellular modem 2120A, a satellite-modem 2120B, a WLAN2120C, a user interface 2130A, an External connection interface 2130Band an Antenna block 2160. The service Bridge 2100 may communicates withthe NOC 170 via other Stationary and/or Portative Bridges (e.g.,portative bridge 1100) using UBFT 160C and/or through the Cellular 160Aand/or satellite 160B communication channels.

FIG. 22 shows a diagramed depiction of one exemplary NOC 2200. The NOC2200 may, for example, represent NOC 170 of FIG. 1. The NOC 2200 mayinclude a plurality of terminals 2210 and servers 2220 interconnectedvia Internet 2250. The servers 2220 may include a Data Base 2230. Thedata base 2230 may, for example, be used to store sensor data and maycontained archives of container events received from one or more CSDs140. The data base 2230 may also store information pertaining to thelocation and condition of cargo containers. The NOC 170 may use theservices of a Commercial world wide digital cellular communicationoperator 2260A, configured to communicate with the CSD 140 and/or theBridge 150 via the cellular communication channels 160A. The NOC 170 mayalso use the service of a Commercial world wide satellite digitalcommunication operator 2260B that configured to communicate with the CSD140 and/or the Bridge 150 via satellite communication channels 160B.

FIG. 23 illustrates a more detailed diagram of the system server 2220and its interaction with other system elements. The server is comprisedof a software complex and the database 2230. Generally, server includesfollowing software: database, program for communication with CSD 2380,programs for communication with operator terminals 2350, and program foranalysis of CSD sensor data 2370.

The database 2230 contains identification and custom data of securedobjects, their condition, CSD operation parameters and commands issuedto security modules by system operators. The database can also includedata from CSD sensors for its further detailed examination by servermeans.

The CSD communication program 2380 receives CSD data duringcommunication session established directly or via bridge, moves the datato server database, extracts operator commands and required service datafrom the database and sends them to modules.

The operator terminal communication program 2350 could be used for dataexchange with custom terminal programs installed on user computers, orfor development of web interface accessible by any authorized user fromany computer without dedicated software installed. Accordingly, therecan be two types of operator terminals: computer with terminalapplication installed 2310 and/or computer with a web browser 2330. Thecomputer with terminal application installed 2310 has the advantage ofquick data exchange. The computer with web browser 2330 provides easyaccess to the system. Both applications handle operator commands issuingto CSD, their saving in the database and transfer of information aboutsecured objects from database to operator terminals.

The CSD sensor data analysis program 2370 is used when CSD software isincapable to process sensor data to the level sufficient for deciding oncondition of secured object due to its limited computing performance.The CSD sensor data analysis program extracts CSD sensor data from thedatabase, processes it and concludes about the condition of CSD andsecured object. Calculation results are stored in server database 2230.

FIG. 24 shows a flowchart illustrating one exemplary method 2399 formonitoring container integrity in accordance with one embodiment. Whenproduction of the CSD 140 takes place, the CSD 140 gets initiated instep 2400. The initiation step 2400 includes a data packet that isdownload into CSD's 140 microcontroller 330. The data packet includescertain parameters that remain unchanged during the lifetime of the CSD140. These parameters include an identification code for the CSD 140, anaddress of a server that may be used to communicate with the CSD, andassociated parameters of communication, etc. The initiation of the CSD140 may, for example, be done by the Bridge 150 or other equipment (notshown).

The operation of the CSD 140 is cyclic. Each CSD cycle lasts onecontainer trip/route (i.e., from the moment of uploading to before theunloading of the container 130). At the route start, the CSD 140 isactivated by the Bridge 150 or the NOC 170. During the CSD activation,in Step 2402, the CSD's microcontroller 330 is cleared of any previouslystored information. New information pertaining to the container's routeand movement schedule, as well as parameters and logic that use regimespertaining to the container's 130 safety, are downloaded into themicrocontroller 330. The CSD is placed in the active mode, in Step 2402,by the Bridge 150 or by the server 2220 of the NOC 170.

During the container's route, condition of the container 130 and itscargo are continually or periodically monitored. During the container's130 route the CSD microcontroller 330 checks for an alert status fromthe integrated sensor processing procedure 470 in Step 2404. Then, inStep 2406, the microcontroller 330 checks if it is a time for the packetof the information pertaining to the container's condition to be sent tothe NOC 170. Then in Step 2408 the microcontroller 330 also checks ifthe request for communication with the NOC 170 was received from theBridge 150. If the NOC 170 receives a message containing an alert statusfrom the CSD 140, the NOC 170 sends a request to the CSD's 140 GPSreceiver 340. In response to this request, the GPS receiver determinesthe geographical location of the CSD 140 in Step 2410, and sends thislocation information to the microcontroller 330.

The CSD 140 may also determine its geographical location by requestinglocation information from the bridge 150. The microcontroller 330 mayalso periodically request location information from either the GPSreceiver 340 or the bridge 150. When the microcontroller sends therequest to the GPS receiver in Step 2420, the GPS receiver 340determines the geographical position of the container 130 in Step 2422.

In Step 2412 the CSD 140 establishes connection to the NOC 170. The CSD140 communicates with the NOC 170 through the Bridge 150 usingUnlicensed International Frequency Band Local Area Communication Network160C. However, if the CSD 140 unable to communicate with the NOC 170through the Bridge 150, The CSD 140 may communicate with the NOC 170 viacellular communications channels 160A or satellite communicationschannels 160B. The CSD's communication via the Bridge 150 may be lessexpensive and may also save energy, as compared to contacting the NOC170 directly via cellular 160A or satellite 160B communication channels.

During communication, in step 2412, between the CSD 140 and the NOC 170,the CSD 140 sends the information packet to the NOC 170. This packet mayinclude one or more of the transmission time, the channel ofcommunication, level of batteries charge, location of the CSD etc. Inresponse to this information the NOC 170 requests that the CSD 140perform certain commands, in Step 2414, pertaining to further operationof the CSD 140, including a regime for monitoring containers safety,etc. I one example, the CSD 140 may receive a command from the NOC 170to deactivate the CSD 140. In step 2416 the CSD verifies that thereceived command is a deactivation command and, if it is, the CSDdeactivates in Step 2418; otherwise Steps 2404-2416 are performedcontinually until a deactivation command is received. In one example,the CSD 140 may deactivate at route completion before the cargo isunloaded. During this deactivation period, the CSD 140 ceases to monitorcontainers and cargo safety.

Proposed system could be employed not only for providing security togeneral ISO containers, but also for ensuring safety of other movingobjects, such as vehicles, boats, etc., as well as of remote fixedobjects, e.g. country houses. The difference in these cases is themobile module at secured object.

FIG. 25 illustrates the diagram of one potential system application—apersonal conditions monitoring system 2500. The system could be employedfor monitoring health conditions and accumulated workload of physicallyweakened persons, those in need for constant medical supervision, aswell as specialists directly engaged in potentially dangerousactivities. Examples include military and special services personnel,professional drivers, athletes, alpinists, etc. Generally, securitymodule could be used for monitoring personal conditions, accumulatedphysical load, for recording events occurred to the person (falling,impacts, changes of position of the body, traveling in transport, etc.),as well as for recording events in the immediate vicinity of the person(gunshots, explosions, changes of temperature and humidity, etc.).

Monitoring module, for example could be the CSD 140, which includes: thesensor array 310 and ADC 320, computing subsystem comprised of themicrocontroller 330 and memory unit, communication subsystem includingthe transceiver 350 and the antenna 360, and power subsystem withreplaceable batteries 370. The combination of sensors is determined bythe purpose of the module. For most applications, the accelerometers310C could be used as they enable to monitor position and movement of aperson, his pulse and a number of events in the surroundings, andelectrodes for measuring amplitude-time parameters of heartbiopotentials (ECG) and electrical impedance of the body toautomatically estimate functional state of cardiovascular system on thebasis of data obtained in examination of electrical activity of theheart, type of vegetative regulation of the rhythm and centralgemodynamic parameters obtained in automatic syndromal ECG diagnostics,heart rate variability analysis and impedance gram analysis of the body.

In its operation, monitoring module continuously monitors sensorindications, performs initial processing of measured values, concludesabout the condition of the person or events occurred to him, and sendsdata to the server 2220. Data is sent to server if personal conditionshave changed or when certain emergency events occur, and periodically,e.g. hourly. Data is transferred over a wireless Wi-Fi based link 160Cor using cellular networks 160B. The server 2220 receives informationfrom the monitoring module 140, performs its additional processing ifnecessary, and stores it in the database 2230. In emergency cases,server sends SMS notification to phone numbers specified for the person.Terminal program displays all data on the terminal 2310 available at theserver in real-time, notifying operator in emergency if necessary.

It should be noted that the matter contained in the above description orshown in the accompanying drawings should be interpreted as illustrativeand not in a limited sense. The following claims are intended to coverall generic and specific features described herein, as well as allstatements of the scope of the present method and system, which, as amatter of language, might be said to fall there between.

1. A security system for monitoring at least one shipping containerbeing transported by at least one cargo transport vehicle, the systemcomprising: a Container Security Device (CSD) configured to be removablycoupled to the at least one freight shipping container wall therebyutilized for monitoring a cargo inside the container and detection ofintrusion violations accompanied with partial destruction of thecontainer wall when in a coupled condition, the CSD including at leastone anti-tamper sensor, a microcontroller and a communication device;wherein the microcontroller generates an alert status based on an outputdata generated by least one anti-tamper sensor being subjected to anindividual sensor processing procedure and then to an integrated sensorprocessing procedure, the integrated sensor processing procedure makesdetermination of the overall container alert status based on the outputdata from said at least one sensor; and a Network Operations Center(NOC), the NOC including a NOC communications facility configured tocommunicate with at least one telecommunication network, the NOC beingconfigured to receive data from each of a plurality of the CSDs andincluding a data storage medium configured to store sensor data andcontained an archive of the container events, wherein the CSDcommunication device is configured to communicate its conditionincluding an alarm transmission to the NOC via satellite communicationchannels, wherein at least one anti-tamper sensor includes anaccelerometer, and the accelerometer output is monitored for exceeding apre-set threshold, which triggers the data to be further analyzed in themicrocontroller for presence of an intrusion signal, and wherein the CSDmicrocontroller compares the accelerometer output to a standard signal,corresponding to a signal generated by a metal cutting instrument todetermine if the metal cutting instrument is used to break the containerwall.
 2. A security system for monitoring at least one shippingcontainer being transported by at least one cargo transport vehicle, thesystem comprising: a Container Security Device (CSD) configured to beremovably coupled to the at least one freight shipping container wallthereby utilized for monitoring a cargo inside the container anddetection of intrusion violations accompanied with partial destructionof the container wall when in a coupled condition, the CSD including atleast one anti-tamper sensor, a microcontroller and a communicationdevice; wherein the microcontroller generates an alert status based onan output data generated by least one anti-tamper sensor being subjectedto an individual sensor processing procedure and then to an integratedsensor processing procedure, the integrated sensor processing proceduremakes determination of the overall container alert status based on theoutput data from said at least one sensor; and a Network OperationsCenter (NOC), the NOC including a NOC communications facility configuredto communicate with at least one telecommunication network, the NOCbeing configured to receive data from each of a plurality of the CSDsand including a data storage medium configured to store sensor data andcontained an archive of the container events, wherein the CSDcommunication device is configured to communicate its conditionincluding an alarm transmission to the NOC via satellite communicationchannels, wherein at least one anti-tamper sensor includes anaccelerometer, and the accelerometer output is monitored for exceeding apre-set threshold, which triggers the data to be further analyzed in themicrocontroller for presence of an intrusion signal, wherein theaccelerometer output is being monitored to detect a vibration signal ofthe container wall, and the CSD microcontroller subjects theaccelerometer vibration signal to a wavelet analysis and a “window”Fourier analysis to produce a data of a current vibration, and whereinthe CSD microcontroller compares the data of the current vibration to astandard data related to a mode of transportation to determine whichmode of transportation is used to move the container.
 3. A securitysystem for monitoring at least one shipping container being transportedby at least one cargo transport vehicle, the system comprising: aContainer Security Device (CSD) configured to be removably coupled tothe at least one freight shipping container wall thereby utilized formonitoring a cargo inside the container and detection of intrusionviolations accompanied with partial destruction of the container wallwhen in a coupled condition, the CSD including at least one anti-tampersensor, a microcontroller and a communication device; wherein themicrocontroller generates an alert status based on an output datagenerated by least one anti-tamper sensor being subjected to anindividual sensor processing procedure and then to an integrated sensorprocessing procedure, the integrated sensor processing procedure makesdetermination of the overall container alert status based on the outputdata from said at least one sensor; and a Network Operations Center(NOC), the NOC including a NOC communications facility configured tocommunicate with at least one telecommunication network, the NOC beingconfigured to receive data from each of a plurality of the CSDs andincluding a data storage medium configured to store sensor data andcontained an archive of the container events, wherein the CSDcommunication device is configured to communicate its conditionincluding an alarm transmission to the NOC via satellite communicationchannels, wherein the CSD further comprises a plurality ofaccelerometers that form a mass-tomograph, and the mass-tomograph isused to build up a spatial picture of a mass distribution through thecontainer, wherein the mass-tomograph used to obtain information aboutthe cargo mass and the mass distribution inside the container todetermine a digital signature (DS), and wherein the DS includesparameters including container mass (M), components of the containermoment of inertia (Ix, Iy, Iz) and the center of mass coordinates of thebody frame (Rm), said parameters characterize spatial distribution ofthe container mass.
 4. The system of claim 3, wherein the change in theDS parameter Rm indicates that the cargo inside the container hasshifted during the containers motion.
 5. The system of claim 3, whereinthe change in the DS parameters Ix, Iy, Iz and Rm indicates that thepartial destruction took place.
 6. The system of claim 3, wherein thechange in the DS parameters M, Ix, Iy, Iz and Rm indicates that thecontainer has been tampered.
 7. A method for monitoring at least onefreight shipping container being transported by at least one cargotransport vehicle, the method comprising: providing a container securitydevice (CSD) configured to be removably coupled to the at least onefreight shipping container wall thereby utilizing for monitoring a cargoinside the container and detection of intrusion violations accompaniedwith partial destruction of container wall when in a coupled condition,the CSD including at least one anti-tamper sensor, a microcontroller,and the CSD communication device; sending an output data obtained fromthe at least one anti-tamper sensor to the microcontroller; analyzingthe output sensor data according to an individual sensor processingprocedure; determining an alert status based on the step of analyzingoutput sensor data according to an integrated sensor processingprocedure based on the analysis of the individual processing procedure;and transmitting the alert status condition to a Network OperationsCenter (NOC), wherein the step of transmitting is performed using apre-existing telecommunications system, wherein the at least oneanti-tamper sensor includes an accelerometer, wherein the accelerometeroutput is being monitored for exceeding a pre-set threshold, whichtriggers the output data to be further analyzed in the microcontrollerfor presence of an intrusion signal, and wherein step of monitoring thecontainer CSD include monitoring parameters including M, Ix, Iy, Iz, andRm, said parameters characterizing spatial distribution of the containermass.